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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
NANCY L. KEMP,

:

Petitioner, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant,

:

Case No. 2000431-CA

:

Priority No. 15

v.
PAUL G. KEMP,
Respondent, Appellant,
and Cross-Appellee.

:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
Petitioner/appellee/cross-appellant (herein Nancy) hereby
replies to the response brief of respondent/appellant/crossappellee (herein Paul) as follows.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah's appellate cases uniformly hold that the primary
purpose of alimony is to maintain both parties, if possible, at
the same standard of living they enjoyed during the marriage.
Where Nancy and Paul spent their entire monthly net income in
support of their lifestyle, the trial court's alimony award
should have been fashioned in such a way as to maintain that
marital standard of living.

In this case, the parties1 post-

divorce income stream should be roughly equalized so each will be
able to pursue the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage.

Paulfs argument for a contrary rule is not supported

by case law or statute. Moreover, neither precedent nor logic
v-

.
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supports Paul's contention that the duration of Nancy's alimony
may be properly terminated at half the duration of the parties'
marriage, especially in light of the 20 years that Nancy did not
pursue or maintain career employment outside the home by the
parties' mutual agreement.
Utah case law also mandates that, absent fraud, retirement
and 401(k) accounts are to be valued as of the date of the
divorce decree.

There is no basis for the trial court's use of

an earlier date herein, and although Paul argues to the contrary,
he has cited no authority to support his contention.
Because the chart used by Paul to summarize Nancy's
financial needs was not produced to her until moments before
trial began, neither Nancy nor her counsel had an opportunity to
adequately review it for inaccuracies.

Given the calculation

errors contained in Paul's financial declaration, the trial
court's admission of Paul's chart without prior review unfairly
prejudiced Nancy.

Likewise, the court's refusal to admit the

"vacation planner" maintained by Paul was unfairly prejudicial.
The planner was relevant to contrast Paul's "enhanced" postseparation lifestyle to Nancy's post-separation struggle to live
within the confines of a sharply reduced income.

The "planner"

was thus relevant to demonstrate the appropriateness of
equalizing income so that each party could attempt to maintain
the marital standard of living.

Further, the court's rejection
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of evidence regarding Paul's vested interest in a family trust
compounded its error by engaging in speculation that Paul's
income would decrease at the time of his retirement and eliminate
his ability to pay alimony for the 30-year duration of the
parties' marriage.
To suggest that Nancy is not entitled to attorney fees is to
ignore the trial court's finding that her actual expenses, even
at her reduced post-separation lifestyle, exceed her income.

The

amount in Nancy's savings account at the time of trial comprised
nothing more than the amount the parties split at the time of
separation augmented by a lump sum the court determined Paul owed
Nancy for certain capital expenses necessitated by the
separation.

Nancy, post-separation, radically curtailed the

level of spending she had enjoyed during the marriage in order to
be able to meet the expenses of litigation.

The trial court

should not have penalized her for her sense of fiscal
responsibility, especially given that Paul challenged neither the
amount nor the necessity of the fees, that the court found them
reasonable, and that they were largely incurred due to actions by
Paul that unnecessarily increased the cost of litigation.
ARGUMENT
I. AN ALIMONY AWARD BASED UPON EQUALIZATION OF INCOME
IS NOT LIMITED TO CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH INCOME IS
INSUFFICIENT TO MEET BOTH PARTIES' LEGITIMATE NEEDS.
Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, 983 P.2d 1103, is
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the sole case Paul cites for his argument that Nancy is not
entitled to an alimony award sufficient to support the lifestyle
she enjoyed during the parties1 marriage.

In Williamson, the

Court reviewed a trial court's termination of alimony pursuant to
a petition to modify.

Holding that the same factors for the

calculation of alimony apply in both initial determinations and
modifications, this Court stated that the goal of alimony "in
those cases in which insufficient resources exist to satisfy both
parties1 legitimate needs" is to equalize not

only

the parties'

post-divorce incomes but their respective standards of living.
Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, Sill (emphasis supplied).1

This

*Even in a needs-based analysis, Paul's reliance on the
trial court's findings is at least partially misplaced. He
suggests that Nancy's budget, by the court's calculation, already
includes $280 per month for the purchase of a car (see Response
to Cross-Appeal at 2 ) . However, the court erred both in its
calculation of a car purchase every six years (see R. 395 at 17,
1. 19 - 18, 1. 2) and its failure to recognize that, under the
parties' marital lifestyle, Nancy's 1992 Jeep Cherokee was, by
the parties' marital practice, overdue for replacement. As Nancy
testified at trial (see R. 575 at 124, 1. 12 - 125, 1. 8 ) , the
parties, during the marriage, acquired six cars in addition to
the Volkswagen Beetle that Paul brought into the marriage.
Dividing the course of the 30-year marriage by six cars, the
parties purchased a new car, on average, at least every five
years. By the time of the divorce, Nancy was entitled to the
replacement value of her vehicle, nominally set by the court at
$20,000 (see R. 395 at 17, 11. 14-18). The court's calculation
of Nancy's car savings expense at only $280 per month was also
error. At the unchallenged marital standard of a five-year
replacement average, Nancy's monthly need for savings toward the
purchase of a car at the nominal value of $20,000.00 is $333.33.
Moreover, the Court's temporary alimony award did not address the
short-term savings for a car, consequently denying Nancy the
accrual of short-term savings for the purchase of a vehicle for
at least a year-and-a-half.
5
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statement acknowledges that the general rule of income
equalization may not sufficiently address parity in the parties1
post-divorce lifestyle where resources are inadequate; therefore,
the additional consideration of equalizing lifestyles comes into
play.

Williamson does not in any way reject the precedent

established in the cases cited by Nancy from both of Utah's
appellate courts that at least a rough equalization of income at
the time of divorce is required.

See Brief of Cross-Appellant at

42-43; see also Griffith v. Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015, 1020 (Utah
App. 1998), afffd, 1999 UT 78, 985 P.2d 255; Howell v. Howell,
806 P.2d 1209, 1213 n.3 (Utah App. 1991); Mortensen v. Mortensen,
760 P.2d 304, 310 (Utah 1988).

Paul has not sought to

distinguish any of these controlling precedents, while at the
same time he asserts, "There is no basis in law or fact to . . .
order an equalization of income" (Response to Cross-Appeal at 1).
Ignoring contrary precedent does not vitiate its applicability.
As previously established at trial (see Brief of CrossAppellant at 21-22), the parties acknowledged their monthly net
income was consumed in support of the marital lifestyle.

In

light of Paul's failure to present evidence to the contrary, his
argument that the trial court's inclusion of short-term savings
in Nancy's legitimate expenses "was purely extra income, and it
was unjustified" (Response to Cross-Appeal at 2) cannot be
credited.
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II. PAUL MISCHARACTERIZES NANCY'S TESTIMONY REGARDING
PREPAYMENT OF PRINCIPAL ON HER MORTGAGE.
In addressing the trial court's limitation of alimony to a
15-year term, Paul claims Nancy argued that she needed to
accelerate the payment of her mortgage in order to avoid making
house payments in her retirement years (see Response to CrossAppeal at 2).

This interpretation misrepresents Nancy's

testimony.
Nancy's testimony at trial addressed the parties' lifelong
marital practice of paying an additional month's principal with
each mortgage payment.

(See R. 575 at 139, 1. 22 - 140, 1. 12;

176, 1. 12 - 177, 1. 13; 204, 1. 24 - 205, 1. 24). Paul has
given no citation to the record for his reference to Nancy's
alleged testimony.

However, it is beyond dispute that the reason

Nancy sought money for additional principal payments on her
mortgage which was to maintain the parties' marital practice.
The potential consequence of paying off her mortgage within a
year after Nancy reaches retirement age is irrelevant to the
duration of alimony.2

As previously explained, the parties,

2

At the point in time that the parties retire and Nancy's
mortgage is paid off, Paul might be able to demonstrate a
material change of circumstances that might justify a potential
modification of the alimony award. It is purely speculative as
to when such events might occur or what each of the parties'
financial circumstances would be at that time. This "crystal
ball" approach to alimony awards would contravene existing legal
precedent and encourage divorce litigants to engage in
"speculative strategies" that waste judicial resources. The
trial court should not have engaged in such speculation.
7
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following the same practice had the marriage continued, would
also have paid off their mortgage at an accelerated pace, freeing
the money that would otherwise have been expended on mortgage
payments for other purposes. Although their financial
allocations might have changed as a result, their lifestyle, in
terms of available resources, would not.
Appellant at 24-27.

See Brief of Cross-

The trial court's termination of alimony on

the basis of Nancy's speculated mortgage prepayment thus
inappropriately denies her the right to employ the resources due
her as she sees fit and denies her the right to pay only the
actual mortgage payment each month.
Paul tacitly acknowledges the correctness of this position
by attempting to apply it to the trial court's refusal to admit
into evidence his post-separation vacation planner.

He argues

that his "decisions regarding how to spend the money that he
earned during the period of the parties' separation had no
bearing on Nancy's legitimate needs" (Response to Cross-Appeal at
3).

What Paul fails to recognize is the distinction between the

amount of money expended in supporting the marital lifestyle and
the particulars of its use.

Nancy sought to use the vacation

planner to establish the disparity in the parties' postseparation lifestyle as compared to the marital lifestyle, not to
micromanage its particular objects.

Paul's apparent objective in

misrepresenting the purpose of Nancy's principal payments is the

8
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opposite:

to dictate the timing and objects of Nancy's

expenditures precisely, allowing for no changes in circumstances
or needs.

Nancy is entitled to financial resources equivalent to

those available to her during the marriage; this is the purpose
of alimony.

How she chooses to use the alimony to which she is

entitled, now or in the future, is neither Paul's legitimate
concern nor a basis for its premature termination.
III. PAUL'S REPLY BRIEF FAILS TO PROVIDE ANY LEGAL
PRECEDENT IN SUPPORT OF HIS POSITION.
Beyond Paul's inaccurate mischaracterization of Williamson
v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, 983 P.2d 1103, Paul has not cited
any legal authority upon which this court could find in his
behalf.

As such, Paul's remaining arguments are inadequately

briefed under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.3
For example, as to the chart he used to portray Nancy's
expenses, Paul has neither stated his grounds for failing to
provide it to Nancy for review in advance of trial nor cited
authority showing that its use under these circumstances

3

Under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, lf[t]he argument shall contain the contentions and
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented,
including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in
the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and
parts of the record relied on." The brief of the appellee must
also conform to this requirement. See Utah R. App. P. 24(b).
Paul's arguments as to the remaining issues do not conform to
this standard.
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conformed to established law.

As to the court's refusal to admit

the contested vacation planner, he asserts that "[t]he Court's
ruling was correct" (Response to Cross-Appeal at 3 ) , but fails to
cite any authority supporting its decision.

With respect to the

trial court's failure to consider the effect of Paul's vested
interest in a family trust, he does not address its relevance to
his continuing ability to pay alimony after his speculated
retirement.4

He cites no testimony or argument of record on any

of these points.

This abbreviated treatment is inadequate to

meet his requirement under the rule.
As to the valuation date issue, Paul cites one case related
to the appropriate valuation date of the parties' 401(k) and
retirement accounts, but he fails to respond to the precedents
cited by Nancy (see Brief of Cross-Appellant at 34) which require
valuation at the time the decree of divorce is entered.

In fact,

his reliance on Parker v. Parker, 2000 UT App 30, 996 P.2d 565,
is misplaced.

While he claims that Parker stands for the generic

proposition that courts may exercise considerable discretion in

4

Paul's inheritance is relevant to his continuing ability to
pay alimony. See Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615, 618-19
(Utah App. 1988)(holding "trial court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding plaintiff alimony from ... defendant's
full and separate property" in order "to realign the disparity
between defendant's and plaintiff's standards of living"). Since
Paul will have received his undisclosed inheritance during the
pendency of this appeal by virtue of his mother's passing, Paul's
complete financial picture is not before the Court.
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determining the financial interests of divorcing parties (see
Response to Cross-Appeal at 4), he ignores the general rule it
states of valuing marital assets at the time of the divorce
decree absent a party's obstructive conduct.

Declaring that

,f

[t]here is no basis to disturb the trial court's decision on

this point" (Response to Cross-Appeal at 4) is a misstatement of
law.5
••'

Finally, with regard to Nancy's claim for attorney's fees,
Paul has completely ignored the factors spelled out in Bell v.
Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991) and the other cases cited by
Nancy (see Brief of Cross-Appellant at 35-36).

He responds

neither to Nancy's explanation for the amount of money in her
savings account at the time of trial (see Brief of CrossAppellant at 39-40) nor to the enumeration of his acts that
resulted in unnecessarily increasing the costs of litigation (see
Brief of Cross-Appellant at 37-38) . He fails to challenge the
fees incurred by Nancy as unreasonable or unnecessary and does
not take issue with Nancy's status as the prevailing party.

In

short, his sole argument is that because Nancy was able to pay
her fees--due to her curtailment of lifestyle in order to do s o —

5

In the recently published opinion of Lieber v. ITT Hartford
Insurance Center, 2000 UT 72, 403 Utah Adv. Rep., the Utah
Supreme Court remanded the issue of the prevailing party's
request for attorney fees, noting that the opposing party's
citations and legal assertions to the Court on appeal were
misleading and unfounded.
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he should escape all liability.

This is not the law.

On numerous occasions Utah's appellate courts have stated
that
11

' [A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues
clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is
not simply a depository in which the appealing party
may dump the burden of argument and research.1" State
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (quoting
Williamson v. Opsahl, 92 111. App. 3d 1087, 416 N.E.2d
783, 784 (111. App. Ct. 1981)) (other citations
omitted). Furthermore, "it is well established that an
appellate court will decline to consider an argument
that a party has failed to adequately brief. Valcarce
v, Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998 (citations
omitted); State v Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah
1989); State v. Am.i cone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah
1984).
State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, c][ 1 I , 97 4 P. 2d 2 69.

Because Paul has

not met his burden, his arguments on these points need not be
considered by the Court.
^

CONCLUSION
Paul's brief provides little in the way of citation to the

record or to relevant case law in support of his disagreement
with Nancy's issues.

In fact, he ignores precedents that

undermine his contentions and engages in generalizations that are
inapplicable to the facts of record.

His inadequate briefing

gives this Court no ground to credit his conclusions.
For these reasons, and for the reasons set forth in Nancy's
opening brief, Nancy respectfully requests the Court to deny
Paul's appeal and to grant Nancy the relief requested in her
cross-appeal, including her reasonable costs and attorney fees
12
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incurred at trial and on appeal.
Dated this

- day of (PJT^C

' 2000.

Respectfully submitted,

( - H r . . Q c• i/.

.

PHILLIP W. DYER
4
PAMELA C. URRY
Co-Counsel for Petitioner
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